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Abstract
We show how to construct a certificateless key agree-
ment protocol from the certificateless key encapsula-
tion mechanism introduced by Lippold et al. (2009a)
in ICISC 2009 using the Boyd et al. (2008) proto-
col from ACISP 2008. We introduce the Canetti-
Krawczyk (CK) model for certificateless cryptogra-
phy, give security notions for Type I and Type II ad-
versaries in the CK model, and highlight the differ-
ences to the existing e2CK model discussed by Lip-
pold et al. (2009b). The resulting CK model is more
relaxed thus giving more power to the adversary than
the original CK model.
Keywords: key agreement, key exchange, key encap-
sulation mechanism, certificateless, standard model,
Diffie-Hellman
1 Introduction
Certificateless encryption introduced by Al-
Riyami & Paterson (2003) is a variant of identity
based encryption that limits the key escrow capabili-
ties of the key generation centre (KGC), which are in-
herent in identity based encryption Boneh & Franklin
(2003). Dent (2008) published a survey of more than
twenty certificateless encryption schemes that focuses
on the different security models and the efficiency of
the respective schemes. In certificateless cryptogra-
phy schemes, there are three secrets per party:
1. The key issued by the key generation centre
(Dent (2008) calls it “partial private key”). We
assume in the following that this key is ID-based,
although it does not necessarily have to be ID-
based.
2. The user generated private key xID (Dent calls
it “secret value”).
3. The ephemeral value chosen randomly for each
protocol run.
Key agreement schemes provide an efficient
means for two parties to communicate over an ad-
versarial controlled channel. An overview of almost
twenty identity based key agreement protocols has
been compiled by Chen et al. (2007); they also pro-
vide security proofs for two of the surveyed proto-
cols. Many ID-based schemes guarantee full privacy
∗Research funded by the Australian Research Council through
Discovery Project DP0666065
Copyright c©2010, Australian Computer Society, Inc. This pa-
per appeared at the Australasian Information Security Con-
ference (AISC2010), Brisbane, Australia. Conferences in Re-
search and Practice in Information Technology (CRPIT), Vol.
105, Colin Boyd and Willy Susilo, Ed. Reproduction for aca-
demic, not-for profit purposes permitted provided this text is
included.
for both parties as long as the key generation cen-
tre (KGC) does not learn any of the ephemeral se-
crets used in computing the session key. But as
Krawczyk (2005) points out, the leakage of ephemeral
keys should not be neglected as they are usually pre-
computed and not stored in secure memory. In the
context of identity based key agreement protocols,
this means that as soon as the ephemeral key of either
party leaks, a malicious KGC is able to compute the
session key.
An overview of current certificateless
key agreement schemes has been compiled by
Swanson (2008). Certificateless key agreement
schemes attempt to provide full privacy even if the
ephemeral secrets of the parties leak to the key gen-
eration centre or if the key generation centre actively
interferes with the messages that are exchanged (e.g.
does a man-in-the-middle attack). The first certifi-
cateless key agreement scheme with a proof of security
was recently published by Lippold et al. (2009b) in the
random oracle model (ROM). Lippold et al. (2009b)
describe why it is hard to construct and prove cer-
tificateless key agreement schemes. The scheme they
propose is computationally very expensive and in the
random oracle model. They leave the construction of
an efficient protocol and the construction of a stan-
dard model secure protocol as open questions. In this
paper, we would like to answer these two open prob-
lems. In ACISP 2008, Boyd et al. (2008) showed how
to construct identity based (ID) and public key based
(PK) authenticated key agreement (AKE) from key
encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) secure in the re-
spective model. In this paper, we extend the model
to certificateless key encapsulation mechanisms (CL-
KEM) and show how to construct an efficient CL-
AKE secure in the standard model from the CL-KEM
scheme in the standard model recently published by
Lippold et al. (2009a).
The security model in this paper is a new de-
velopment of the e2CK security model defined by
Lippold et al. (2009b) and the Canetti & Krawczyk
(2001) security model. We extend the Canetti and
Krawcyk (CK) model in Section 3 on page 3 to al-
low partial corruption of the long term secrets. We
provide a meaningful merge between the e2CK and
the CK models for certificateless encryption that is
strong enough to realistically model an adversary
against the protocol and is at the same time flexible
enough to allow a simple construction of a certificate-
less key agreement protocol in the standard model.
The model is more relaxed due to the fact that we
also allow partial corruption of parties. A certificate-
less key agreement protocol in this model is secure
even if one party is fully corrupted and one party is
partially corrupted. Additionally, we define the no-
tion of weak Type I and weak Type II CK adversaries
for certificateless key agreement. Type I adversaries
model an outsider adversary that does not know the
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master secret key of the KGC; Type II adversaries
model insider adversaries that possess the master se-
cret key of the KGC. These definitions correspond to
the weak Type I and weak Type II adversary def-
initions for certificateless encryption given by Dent
(2008).
The main contributions of this paper are:
• First efficient provably secure protocol for certifi-
cateless key exchange in the standard model.
• New enhanced security model for certificateless
key exchange based on the well-known Canetti-
Krawczyk model, giving more power to the ad-
versary.
• New definition of weak Type I and weak Type
II certificateless adversaries in the Canetti-
Krawczyk model.
2 Definitions
Def. 1 Min-entropy Gennaro et al. (2004)
Let χ be a probability distribution over A. The min-
entropy of χ is the value
min-ent(χ) = min
x∈A:Prχ[x]6=0
(− log2(Pr
χ
[x])) (1)
If χ has min-entropy t, then for all x ∈ A : Prχ[x] ≤
2−t.
Def. 2 Strong randomness extractor Nisan &
Zuckerman (1996)
A family of efficiently computable hash functions H =
{hκ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k|κ ∈ {0, 1}d} is called a strong
(m, )-randomness extractor, if for any random vari-
able X over {0, 1}n that has min-entropy at least m,
if κ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}d, and
R is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k, the
two distributions 〈κ, hκ(X)〉 and 〈κ,R〉 have statisti-
cal distance , that is
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}k
|Pr[hκ(X) = x]− Pr[R = x]| =  (2)
Def. 3 Pseudorandom Function Family(PRF)
Let F = {fs}s∈S be a family of functions for security
parameter k ∈ N and with seed s ∈ S = S(k). Let C
be an adversary that is given oracle access to either fs
for s $← K or a truly random function with the same
domain and range as the functions in F . F is said
to be pseudorandom if C’s advantage in distinguish-
ing whether it has access to a random member of F
or a truly random function is negligible in k, for all
polynomial-time adversaries C. That is,
Advp-randF,C (k) =
∣∣∣Pr[CFs(·)(1k) = 1]
−Pr[CRand(·)(k) = 1]
∣∣∣ (3)
is negligible in k.
Def. 4 Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
Let F be a cyclic group of order p′ generated by an
element f . Consider the set F 3 = F ×F ×F and the
following two probability distributions over it:
RF = {(fa, f b, f c) : (a, b, c) $← Zp′} (4)
and
DHF = {(fa, f b, fab) : (a, b) $← Zp′} (5)
We say the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
holds over F = 〈f〉 if the two distributions RF andDHF are indistinguishable by all polynomial-time ad-
versaries D. More precisely, for k = |p′|
AdvddhF,D(k) =
∣∣∣Pr[D(1k, ρ) = 1|ρ $← DHF ]
−Pr[D(1k, ρ) = 1|ρ $← RF ]
∣∣∣ (6)
Def. 5 CL-KEM
A certificateless key encapsulation mechanism (CL-
KEM) E = (Setup, KeyDer, UserKeyGen, Enc, Dec)
consists of five polynomial-time algorithms:
Setup (mpk,msk) $← Setup(1k) Given the security
parameter k ∈ N, the Setup algorithm returns a
master public key mpk, and a master secret key
msk.
KeyDer dID
$← KeyDer(mpk,msk, ID) generates an
ID-based private key dID from the master secret
key msk for identity ID.
UserKeyGen (xID, βID)
$← UserKeyGen(mpk, ID)
generates a user secret key xID and a user cer-
tificateless public key βID form the master public
key and the identity.
Enc (C,K) $← Enc(mpk, ID, βID) generates the key
K, and the certificateless key encapsulation C of
K.
Dec K $← Dec(dID, xID, C) extracts the key K from
the certificateless encapsulation C using the ID-
based private key dID and the user secret key xID.
This definition of a CL-KEM is based on the defini-
tion given in Lippold et al. (2009a).
Def. 6 CL-KEM Security
In a CL-KEM environment, the adversary has access
to the following oracles:
Reveal master key: The adversary is given access
to the master secret key.
Reveal ID-based key(ID): The adversary extracts
the ID-based private key of party ID.
Get user public key(ID): The adversary obtains
the certificateless public key for ID. If the cer-
tificateless key for the identity has not yet been
generated, it is generated with the user key gen
algorithm.
Replace public key(ID, pk): Party ID’s certificate-
less public key is replaced with pk chosen by the
adversary. All communication (encryption, en-
capsulation) for Party ID will use the new public
key.
Reveal secret value(ID): The adversary extracts
the secret value xID that corresponds to the certifi-
cateless public key for party ID. If the adversary
issued a replace public key query for ID before,
⊥ is returned.
Decapsulate(ID, C): The adversary learns the de-
capsulation of C under ID or ⊥ if C is invalid or
if the adversary replaced the public key of ID.
Decapsulate(ID, C, x): The adversary learns the de-
capsulation of C under ID using the secret value
x. The special symbol ⊥ will be returned if C is
invalid.
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Get challenge key encapsulation(ID∗): The ad-
versary requests a challenge key encapsulation
and thus marks the transition from Oracles1 to
Oracles2 in Experiment 7. The simulator re-
turns a challenge key encapsulation as described
in Experiment 7.
The security of a CL-KEM scheme E = (Setup,
KeyDer, UserKeyGen, Enc, Dec) is defined by the fol-
lowing experiment:
Exp. Chall.cl−kem−ccaCL-KEMM (k) :
(mpk,msk) $← CL-KEM Setup(k)
(ID∗, state) $←MOracles1(find,mpk)
K∗0
$← K; (C∗,K∗1 ) $← CL-KEM Enc(pk, ID∗)
γ
$← {0, 1};K∗ = K∗γ
γ′ $←MOracles2(guess,K∗, C∗, state)
Return γ == γ′
(7)
The advantage an adversary M has against a CL-
KEM scheme is therefore expressed by
AdvCL-KEMM (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exp. Chall.cl−kem−ccaCL-KEMM (k)]
−1/2
∣∣∣
For a Type I adversary M, Oracles1 and
Oracles2 mean access to all oracles listed above with
the following limitations:
1. No reveal master key queries.
2. C∗ must not be submitted to a decapsulate oracle
under ID∗.
3. Not both (reveal secret value OR replace public
key) AND reveal ID-based key oracles may be
asked for ID∗.
For a Type 2 adversary M, Oracles1 and
Oracles2 are subject to the following limitations:
1. Oracles1 and Oracles2 now includes reveal
master key as allowed query,
2. C∗ must not be submitted to a decapsulate oracle
under ID∗.
3. reveal secret value must never be asked for ID∗,
4. Oracles1 must not include replace public key for
ID∗.
This definition stems from (Lippold et al. 2009a,
Section 3.3)
Def. 7 Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (wPFS)
A key-exchange protocol provides weak PFS (wPFS) if
an attacker M cannot distinguish from random a key
of any session for which the session and its matching
session are clean1 even if M has learned the private
keys of both peers to the session (Krawczyk 2005, Def-
inition 22)
Def. 8 Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI)
We say that a KE-attacker M that has learned the
private key of party Aˆ succeeds in a Key-compromise
impersonation (KCI) attack against Aˆ ifM is able to
distinguish from random the session key of a complete
session at Aˆ for which the session peer is uncorrupted
and the session and its matching session (if it exists)
are clean (Krawczyk 2005, Definition 20).
1Roughly speaking clean is the same as fresh in Definition 9.
3 Formal definition of the security model
We want to use the Protocol by Boyd et al. (2008)
to construct a certificateless key agreement in the
standard model. Current existing security definitions
for key agreement protocols were defined by Swanson
(2008) in the e2CK model and later improved by Lip-
pold et al. (2009b). However, the protocol by Boyd
et al. (2008) is proven in the Canetti-Krawczyk model.
We continue to list the two security models and then
discuss the major differences.
3.1 The e2CK model
Lippold et al. (2009b) strengthened the e2CK security
model for certificateless key exchange that was intro-
duced by Swanson (2008). We recapitulate the model
here briefly.
Let U = {U1, . . . Un} be a set of parties. The pro-
tocol may be run between any two of these parties.
For each party there exists an identity based public
key that can be derived from its identifier. There is a
key generation centre that issues identity based pri-
vate keys to the parties through a secure channel. Ad-
ditionally, the parties generate their own secret values
and corresponding certificateless public keys.
The adversary is in control of the network over
which protocol messages are exchanged. Πti,j rep-
resents the tth protocol session which runs at party
i with intended partner party j. Additionally, the
adversary is allowed to replace certificateless public
keys that are used to compute the session key. The
adversary does not have to disclose the private key
matching the replaced certificateless public key to the
respective party.
A session Πti,j enters an accepted state when it
computes a session key SKti,j . Note that a session
may terminate without ever entering into an accepted
state. The information of whether a session has ter-
minated with acceptance or without acceptance is as-
sumed to be public. The session Πti,j is assigned a
partner ID pid = (IDi, IDj). The session ID sid of
Πti,j at party i is the transcript of the messages ex-
changed with party j during the session. Two sessions
Πti,j and Π
u
j,i are considered matching if they have the
same pid (and sid).
The game runs in two phases. During the first
phase of the game, the adversary M is allowed to
issue the following queries in any order:
Send(Πti,j , x): If the session Π
t
i,j does not exist, it
will be created as initiator at party i if x = λ, or
as a responder at party j otherwise. If the par-
ticipating parties have not been initiated before,
the respective private and public keys are cre-
ated. Upon receiving the message x, the protocol
is executed. After party i has sent and received
the last set of messages specified by the proto-
col, it outputs a decision indicating accepting or
rejecting the session. In the case of one-round
protocols, party i behaves as follows:
x = λ: Party i generates an ephemeral value and
responds with an outgoing message only.
x 6= λ: If party i is a responder, it generates
an ephemeral value for the session and re-
sponds with an outgoing message m and a
decision indicating acceptance or rejection
of the session. If party i as an initiator, it
responds with a decision indicating accept-
ing or rejecting the session.
In this work, we require i 6= j, i.e. a party will
not run a session with itself.
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Reveal master key The adversary is given access
to the master secret key.
Session key reveal(Πti,j): If the session has not ac-
cepted, it returns ⊥, otherwise it reveals the ac-
cepted session key.
Reveal ID-based secret(i): Party i responds with
its ID-based private key, e.g. sH1(IDi).
Reveal secret value(i): Party i responds with its
secret value xi that corresponds to its certificate-
less public key. If i has been asked the replace
public key query before, it responds with ⊥.
Replace public key(i, pk): Party i’s certificateless
public key is replaced with pk chosen by the ad-
versary. Party i will use the new public key for
all communication and computation.
Reveal ephemeral key(Πti,j): Party i responds
with the ephemeral secret used in session Πti,j
We can group the key reveal queries into three types:
the reveal master key and reveal ID-based secret
queries try to undermine the security of the ID-based
part of the scheme, the reveal secret value and replace
public key queries try to undermine the security of the
public key based part of the scheme, and the reveal
ephemeral key query tries to undermine the security
of one particular session.
We define the state fully corrupt as a session that
was asked all three types of reveal queries: the re-
veal master key or reveal ID-based secret, the reveal
secret value or the replace public key, and the reveal
ephemeral key query.
Once the adversaryM decides that the first phase
is over, it starts the second phase by choosing a fresh
session Πti,j and issuing a Test(Π
t
i,j) query, where the
fresh session and test query are defined as follows:
Def. 9 Fresh session
A session Πti,j is fresh if (1) Π
t
i,j has accepted; (2)
Πti,j is unopened (not being issued the session key re-
veal query); (3) the session state at neither party par-
ticipating in this session is fully corrupted; (4) there
is no opened session Πuj,i which has a matching con-
versation to Πti,j.
Test(Πti,j) The input session Π
t
i,j must be fresh. A
bit b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen. If b = 0, the
adversary is given the session key, otherwise it
randomly samples a session key from the distri-
bution of valid session keys and returns it to the
adversary.
After the test(Πti,j) query has been issued, the ad-
versary can continue querying except that the test
session Πti,j should remain fresh. We emphasize here
that partial corruption is allowed as this is a bene-
fit of our security model. Additionally, replace public
key queries may be issued to any party after the test
session has been completed.
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs
a guess bˆ for b. If bˆ = b, we say that the adversary
wins. The adversary’s advantage in winning the game
is defined as
AdvM(k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[M wins]− 12
∣∣∣∣
3.2 The Canetti-Krawczyk model
We give a slightly shortened version of the CK model
used by Boyd et al. (2008) and refer the reader to
the paper for details. In the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK)
model, a protocol pi is modeled as a collection of n pro-
grams running at different parties P1, . . . , Pn. Each
program is an interactive probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) machine. A session is defined as an in-
vocation of pi at party Pi, and every party may have
multiple sessions running concurrently. The commu-
nication network is controlled by the adversary M,
who is also a PPT machine. The adversary controls
the message flow between the parties by activating a
party Pi, which may be done in two ways:
1. An establish session (Pi, Pj , s) request where Pj
is another party with whom the session is to be
established, and s is the session ID string which
uniquely identifies a session between the partici-
pants.
2. By means of an incoming message m with a spec-
ified sender Pj .
A matching session is defined by having two session
(Pi, Pj , s) and (P ′i , P
′
j , s
′) for that Pi = P ′i , Pj = P
′
j
and s = s′. s is defined by the concatenation of the
messages exchanged by the respective parties. M can
ask any of the following queries:
corrupt(Pi) M learns the long term key of Pi.
session-key(Pi, Pj , s) M learns the session key of an
accepted session for (Pi, Pj , s) at party Pi.
session-state(Pi, Pj , s) Returns the internal state
information of party Pi with respect to session
s with party Pj but does not include the long
term key of Pj .
session-expiration(Pi, Pj , s) Erases the session key
form for session s with Pj from the internal mem-
ory of Pi.
test-session(Pi, Pj , s) The challenger B selects a
random bit b. If b = 1, then the correct session
key is returned. Otherwise, a randomly chosen
key from the probability distribution of the key
space of the protocol is returned. This query
may only be asked to a session that is not ex-
posed, where an exposed session is defined as a
session that has been asked either
• a session-state or session-key reveal query
to this session or the matching session, or
• a corrupt query to either partner before the
session expires at that partner.
3.3 Comparison of the two models
Although the send query in the e2CK model roughly
corresponds to the activation in the CK model, there
are some subtle differences in the security models that
we try to sort out in the following.
The CK model used by Boyd et al. (2008) does not
consider partial corruption of the long term secret, as
Boyd et al. only consider cases where a party has
only one long term secret. On the contrary, in the
e2CK model used by Lippold et al. (2009b), each party
has two long-term secrets which may be corrupted
“individually”.
Furthermore, Boyd et al. (2008) do not allow the
adversary only to extract the randomness used in a
specific run of the protocol, i.e. they do not allow
ephemeral key reveal queries.
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On the other hand, Boyd et al. allow state re-
veal queries in addition to the session-key reveal query
that both models allow, but both queries are not al-
lowed for the test session.
For the following, we propose the following mean-
ingful mapping from one model to the other:
• Instead of using ephemeral key reveal, we allow
session state reveal queries. We note that session
state reveal queries must not target the test ses-
sion, so they are of limited use to the adversary.
Our goal in this paper is to extend the KEM-
KEM-AKE construction by Boyd et al. (2008) to
the certificateless case. As the proofs for KEM
schemes do not allow the adversary to extract the
randomness used during the key encapsulation
(which would be the equivalent to an ephemeral
key), ephemeral key reveal queries cannot be al-
lowed in a protocol that uses a KEM as a building
block for any other scheme. KEM schemes would
be trivial to break if any adversary was allowed
to recover the randomness used in the challenge
query.
• However, we allow the adversary to corrupt the
long term secrets of a party “individually”. On
the one hand this allows for Type II certificate-
less adversaries that correspond to a key genera-
tion centre for the ID-based scheme as described
in Section 3.4, on the other hand we give more
power to the adversary as the protocol must still
be secure even if one party is fully corrupted and
the other party is partially corrupted.
3.4 Adversaries against weakly CK-secure
certificateless key agreement schemes
Both Swanson (2008) and Lippold et al. (2009b) give
only definitions for adversaries in the e2CK model.
We give the first security definitions for an adver-
sary in the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model against a
weakly secure certificateless key agreement protocol.
The Type I adversary models an outsider adversary
that may corrupt parties but may not learn the mas-
ter secret key of the key generation centre (KGC).
The Type II adversary reflects a malicious but hon-
est KGC.
Def. 10 Weak Type I CK-secure key agree-
ment scheme
A certificateless key agreement scheme is Weak Type I
CK-secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time ad-
versary M has negligible advantage in winning the
game described in Section 3 on page 3 subject to the
following constraints.
• M may corrupt at most two long-term secrets
of one party involved in the test session, and one
long-term secret of the other party involved in the
test session.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party;
however, this counts as the corruption of one se-
cret.
• M may not reveal the secret value of any identity
for which it has replaced the certificateless public
key.
• M is not allowed to ask session key reveal queries
for session keys computed by identities where M
replaced the identity’s public key.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party
after the test query has been issued.
• M is not allowed to ask session state reveal
queries for sessions at identities where M re-
placed the identity’s public key.
• M is not allowed to ask session state reveal
queries for the test session or the matching ses-
sion to the test session.
• M is not allowed to ask ephemeral key reveal
queries.
Def. 11 Weak Type II CK-secure key agree-
ment scheme
A certificateless key agreement scheme is Weak Type
II CK-secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time
adversary M has negligible advantage in winning the
game described in Section 3 on page 3 subject to the
following constraints.
• M is given the master secret key s at the start
of the game.
• M may corrupt at most one user secret key of
the parties participating in the test session.
• M is allowed to replace the certificateless pub-
lic key of any party; however, this counts as the
corruption of a user secret key.
• M may not reveal the secret value of any identity
for which it has replaced the certificateless public
key.
• M is not allowed to ask session key reveal queries
for session keys computed by identities where the
identity’s public key was replaced.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party
after the test query has been issued.
• M is not allowed to ask session state reveal
queries for sessions at identities where M re-
placed the identity’s public key.
• M is not allowed to as session state reveal
queries for the test session or the matching ses-
sion to the test session.
• M is not allowed to ask ephemeral key reveal
queries.
4 The Boyd et al. Protocol with a CL-KEM
We recall the generic AKE protocol constructions
from KEM schemes by Boyd et al. (2008) from
ACISP’08. The first scheme does not offer weak per-
fect forward secrecy (wPFS) as described in Defini-
tion 7 on page 3 but offers key compromise imperson-
ation (KCI) resistance as described in Definition 8 on
page 3. It is shown in Table 1 on the following page.
The second scheme adds an additional Diffie-Hellman
to the first protocol and then achieves both weak per-
fect forward secrecy and KCI resistance. The proto-
col is shown in Table 2 on the next page. Boyd et al.
(2008) prove these protocols secure even if the long
term secret of one party is known to the adversary.
We use these protocols to construct a weakly CK-
secure certificateless key agreement scheme in the
standard model, by replacing the KEM scheme in the
Boyd et al. (2008) construction with the certificate-
less KEM (CL-KEM) scheme recently proposed by
Lippold et al. (2009a). Constructing a certificateless
key agreement scheme in the standard model is an
open problem considered by Lippold et al. (2009b).
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A B
(CA,K ′A)
$← enc(pk, IDB) (CB ,K ′B) $← enc(pk, IDA)
A,CA−−−→
B,CB←−−−−
K ′B = dec(pk, dIDA , CB) (K
′
A = dec(pk, dIDB , CA))
K ′′A = Exctκ(K
′
A);K
′′
B = Exctκ(K
′
B) K
′′
B = Exctκ(K
′
B);K
′′
A = Exctκ(K
′
A)
s = A||CA||B||CB s = A||CA||B||CB
KA = ExctK′′A(s)⊕ ExctK′′B (s) KB = ExctK′′B (s)⊕ ExctK′′A(s)
Erase all state except (KA, s) Erase all state except (KB , S)
Table 1: Boyd et al. (2008) Protocol 1
A B
yA
$← Zp;YA = fyA yB $← Zp;YB = fyB
(CA,K ′A)
$← enc(pk, IDB) (CB ,K ′B) $← enc(pk, IDA)
A,CA,YA−−−−−−→
B,CB ,YB←−−−−−−
K ′B = dec(pk, dIDA , CB) (K
′
A = dec(pk, dIDB , CA))
K ′′A = Exctκ(K
′
A);K
′′
B = Exctκ(K
′
B) K
′′
B = Exctκ(K
′
B);K
′′
A = Exctκ(K
′
A)
K ′′AB = ExctκY
yA
B K
′′
BA = ExctκY
yB
A
s = A||CA||YA||B||CB ||YB s = A||CA||YA||B||CB ||YB
KA = ExpdK′′A(s)⊕ ExpdK′′B (s) KB = ExpdK′′B (s)⊕ ExpdK′′A(s)⊕ExpdK′′AB (s) ⊕ExpdK′′BA(s)
Erase all state except (KA, s) Erase all state except (KB , S)
Table 2: Boyd et al. (2008) Protocol 2
In Table 1 and Table 2, the following notations are
used:
• {ExpdK(·)}K∈U1 : {0, 1}σ → U2 is a pseudoran-
dom function family as in Definition 3 on page 2.
• Exctκ(·) : K → U1 is a randomly chosen strong
(m, )-randomness extractor as in Definition 2 on
page 2 for appropriate m and .
• norac is the total number of sessions / oracles
created by the adversary against the protocol.
• 1p is the maximum probability that C1 = C2
where (C1,K1)
$← enc(pk, ID) and (C2,K2) $←
enc(pk, ID) for any identity ID.
5 Proving the derived protocol secure
Lippold et al. (2009b) point out that a “natural” com-
bination of an ID-based key agreement protocol (ID-
AKE) and a public key based key agreement proto-
col (PK-AKE) does not give full security in the CL-
AKE setting. In the e2CK model described by Lip-
pold et al. (2009b) there are three secrets per party
of which the adversary may corrupt any two to gain
an advantage in breaking the CL-AKE protocol. The
adversary may choose the secrets in its favour: by cor-
rupting the ID-based secrets at party one an the PK
secret at the other party, and the ephemeral secrets at
both parties, both protocols are broken although each
party still holds one uncompromised secret. We in-
vestigate if a CL-AKE from a CL-KEM plugged into
the KEM-KEM construction by Boyd et al. (2008)
provides reasonable security.
Obviously, as Protocol 1 from Boyd et al. (2008)
does not achieve weak forward secrecy, the security of
the protocol relies on the long-term keys of the respec-
tive parties. Thus, this type of protocol will not give
resistance if all four long term secrets of both parties
are compromised. We now turn to the security proof
for the protocol in the reconsidered security model
explained in Section 3.3 on page 4 and Section 3.4 on
the previous page.
We follow the proof given in Boyd et al. (2008)
closely and will only list the changes that are needed
to prove the scheme secure against a certificateless
adversary. Recall that the weak certificateless adver-
sary may not ask session key or session state reveal
queries for sessions at a party where the adversary re-
placed that party’s certificateless public key nor may
these queries be asked for the test session.
We give some intuition why the proof for the Boyd
et al. (2008) protocol does still hold in the reconsid-
ered security model from section 3.3 on page 4 and
section 3.4 on the previous page. In a CL-KEM set-
ting, there are only two secrets per party considered,
as a KEM is a “receive only” protocol. The ephemeral
secret used to construct the message is never disclosed
to the adversary in a KEM protocol. The security of
the KEM holds in the certificateless case if a party has
at least one uncompromised secret, i.e. an uncom-
promised ID-based key or an uncompromised user se-
cret key. Consider the CL-KEM-KEM-AKE setting,
where the test session runs between party A with ID-
based private key dA and user secret key xA and party
B with ID-based private key dB and user secret key
xB . There are now essentially three cases to distin-
guish:
1. A weak Type I CK-adversary M that corrupts
both long-term secrets dA and xA of party A and
one long-term secret of party B. In this case the
security of the KEM at party B guarantees the
security of the protocol.
2. A weak Type I CK-adversary M that corrupts
only one long-term secret of party A but both
long-term secrets dB , xB of party B. In this case
the security of the KEM at party A guarantees
the security of the protocol.
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3. The case where the CK-adversary corrupts all
long-term keys dA, xA, dB , xB of the respective
parties. In this case Protocol 1 is broken, but
Protocol 2 is still secure due to the additional
Diffie-Hellman.
For Protocol 1 we propose the following theorem
similar to Boyd et al. (2008):
Theorem 1 Let B be any adversary against Proto-
col 1. Then the advantage of B against the SK-
security (with partial WFS and KCI resistance) of
Protocol 1 is:
AdvskB (k) ≤
n2orac
b
+ 2norac
(
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k)+
+ Advp−randF,C (k)
)
The proof in Appendix A on the following page for
Protocol 1 works for the cases 1 and 2 above and is
very similar to the proof in Boyd et al. (2008). All
games in the proof were left as in the original pa-
per, only Game 3 was modified. In the certificate-
less setting, besides fully corrupting party A in case
one, the adversary is also allowed to partially cor-
rupt party B. In case two similarly the adversary is
allowed to fully corrupt party B and partially cor-
rupt party A. However, in both cases the CL-KEM
scheme for the partially corrupted party (B in case 1
and A in case 2) is still secure, as by definition CL-
KEM schemes tolerate partial corruption. Boyd et al.
(2008) use any successful adversary against the KEM-
KEM-AKE construction as an adversary against the
KEM scheme in Game 3 of their proof. This proof
technique carries through to the certificateless case
in our modified security model as all oracle queries
that the adversary may ask can still be answered by
the challenger as described in Game 3 of Boyd et al.
(2008).
For Protocol 2 on the previous page we have the
following theorem in analogy to Boyd et al. (2008):
Theorem 2 Let B be any adversary against Proto-
col 2. Then the advantage of B against the SK-
security (with WFS and KCI resistance) of Protocol 2
is:
AdvskB (k) ≤
max
(
2n2oracAdv
ddh
F,D(k) + 2
+2Advp−randF,C (k),
n2orac
p
+ 2norac
(
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k)
++ Advp−randF,C (k)
))
.
As Boyd et al. (2008) do not alter Game 3 in their
proof of Protocol 2 with respect to the proof of Pro-
tocol 1, the proof carries through o the CL-KEM case
as well. We included their proof in Appendix B.
6 Conclusion
We give the first construction of an efficient certifi-
cateless key agreement scheme proven secure in the
standard model. We use the existing KEM-KEM con-
struction by Boyd et al. (2008) from ACISP 2008 to
construct our scheme. We review existing security
notions for certificateless key exchange and propose
the new notion of Canetti-Krawczyk security for cer-
tificateless key agreement. We show that the KEM-
KEM construction by Boyd et al. (2008) holds also
for certificateless KEM schemes in the new certifi-
cateless Canetti-Krawczyk security model for certifi-
cateless key agreement.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We now proceed to prove Theorem 1. The proof has
two parts; the first part proves the security of Pro-
tocol 1 proves the security of Protocol 2 when the
partner to the test session is not corrupted. The sec-
ond part proves the security of Protocol 1 when the
partner to the test session is corrupted (in this case,
we require the test session to have a matching session
by the time B finishes). Remember that we are only
considering partial forward secrecy, and therefore B
does not corrupt both the owner of the test session
and the corresponding partner.
Throughout the proof, we call each session to be
activated at a party an oracle. We denote the oracles
with which B interacts ΠiX where X is the name of a
party and i is the number of the oracle. We number
the oracles such that ΠiX is the i
th oracle created by
B out of all oracles created by B (i.e. if ΠiX and ΠjY
are two oracles, then i = j implies X = Y ). Also, for
any party, X, the identity of that party is denoted
eX . We consider the following series of games withB.
A.1 Case 1: Partner to the test-session is not
corrupted
In this case, the partner to the test session is either
not corrupted or only partially corrupted, and the
owner of the test session may be fully corrupted, ei-
ther prior to the session (as in a KCI attack), or af-
ter the session expires (as in a forward secrecy at-
tack). This part of the proof uses the following series
of games with B.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction
with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and
when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the
test session query, otherwise a random key from U2
is returned.
Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that if two different sessions output exactly the
same message and have the same intended partner,
the protocol halts.
Game 2. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that before the adversary begins, a random
value m $← {1, 2, . . . , norac} is chosen. We call the
mth oracle to be activated the target oracle. If the
target oracle is not the test oracle, the protocol halts
and B fails and outputs a random bit. We denote the
input message to the target oracle with C, the corre-
sponding output message with C∗, the target oracle’s
owner with T and the target oracle’s intended partner
with T ∗. Note that there may not be a matching test
session activated at T ∗.
Game 3. In this game, a random value K ′∗ is chosen.
Whenever C∗ is used as input to an oracle owned
by T ∗, the calculation of the key is modified so that
K ′∗ is used in place of dec(pk , dT∗ , C∗); the message
output by this oracle is calculated as usual. Similarly,
K ′∗ is used instead of K ′T in the calculation of the
session key by T .
The rest of the Game 3 is the same as Game 2. If
b = 1, a random key from U2 is returned. Otherwise,
K ′∗ is used in the computation of the test session as
described above.
Game 4. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that a random value K ′′∗ $← U1 is chosen and
the use of Exct(K ′∗) is replaced with K ′′∗.
Game 5. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that whenever the value ExpdK′′∗ (s′) for any
s′ would be used in generating keys, a random value
from U2 is used instead (the same random value is
used for the same value of s′; a different random value
is chosen for different s′).
A.2 Analysis of Games 0 to 2:
Let psameMsg be the probability of two or more ses-
sions outputting the same message. We have
1− psameMsg > 1− n
2
orac
b.
Then
|Pr[σ0]− Pr[σ1]| < n
2
orac
2b
(8)
when 12 >
norac−1
b > 0
This can be used to bound τ0 as follows:
τ0 = |2 Pr[σ0]− 1| (9)
≤ 2
(
|Pr[σ0]− Pr[σ1]|+
∣∣∣∣Pr[σ1]− 12
∣∣∣∣) (10)
≤ n
2
orac
b
+ τ1 (11)
In Game 2, the probability of the protocol halting
due to an incorrect choice of m is 1− 1norac . Whether
or not an abortion would occur in this game could be
detected in the previous game if it also chose m in the
same way. Therefore, we may use Dent’s gamehop-
ping technique as described in Dent (2006) to find:
τ2 =
1
norac
τ1 ⇒ noracτ2 = τ1 (12)
and (11) gives
τ0 ≤ n
2
orac
b
+ noracτ2 (13)
A.3 Analysis of Game 3:
We now construct adversary A against the security
of the CL-KEM, using B. A is constructed such that
when it receives the real key for the CL-KEM scheme,
the view of B is the same as in Game 2, but if A re-
ceives a random CL-KEM key, the view of B is the
same as in Game 3. Then, by the security of the
CL-KEM scheme, we can claim these games are in-
distinguishable.
To begin, A is given the master public key pk . A
passes this value as well as the description of Exct(·),
its key κ and {ExpdK (·)}K∈U1 to B. Recall that A
has access to the corresponding oracles OKeyDer(·) and
Odec(·, ·).A runs as described in Game 2, except that when
the target session is activated, A outputs eT∗ as the
identity on which it wants to be tested. A receives
a ciphertext C∗ for T ∗ and key K ′∗, which may
be the decryption of C∗ or may be a random CL-
KEM key, each with equal probability. A then uses
C∗ as the output of the target session, modifies the
calculation of keys so that K ′∗ is used in place of
dec(pk ,KeyDer(pk , α, eT∗), C∗), and uses K ′∗ instead
of K ′T to find the answer to the test session query
when b = 0.
All legitimate queries made by B can still be an-
swered by A using its oracles in as follows.
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• A corrupt query on some identity eX may be
answered with OKeyDer(eX).
• A partial corrupt query can be made by on the
partner to the test session, T ∗. This query can
be answered with OKeyDer(T ∗) for either the cer-
tificateless secret value or the ID-based private
key but not both, as these queries are allowed in
a certificateless KEM.
• A must maintain the session state of each oracle
so that it may be returned in answer to session
state reveal queries (session state reveal is not al-
lowed on the test session or its matching session).
• Any message CX to any party (including T ∗)
with identity eX may be decrypted usingOdec(eX , CX) to generate keys for reveal session
key queries and the test query. Any party other
than T ∗ can be decrypted with the private key
that A generated for that party. A message M
to T ∗ may be decrypted using Odec.
When B halts and outputs its bit b′, A halts and
outputs 1 − b′. The probability that A is correct is
Pr[σ2] when K ′∗ is the real key for the CL-KEM mes-
sage, and 1 − Pr[σ3] when K ′∗ is not the key for the
CL-KEM message. We can then find that:
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) = (14)∣∣∣2(1
2
(
Pr[σ2] + 1− Pr[σ3]
))− 1∣∣∣ (15)
= Pr[σ2]− Pr[σ3] (16)
τ2 = |2 Pr[σ2]− 1| (17)
≤ |2 Pr[σ2]− 2 Pr[σ3]|+ |2 Pr[σ3]− 1| (18)
τ2 ≤ 2AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) + τ3 (19)
A.4 Analysis of Game 4
We now consider an adversary, D, against the secu-
rity of the randomness extraction function. This ad-
versary runs a copy of B and interacts with B in such
a manner that it is the same as when B interacts with
either Game 3 or 4. D receives a key κ for the ran-
domness extraction function and a value R1 such that
either R1 = Exct(X) for some X
$← K or R1 $← U1. D
sets κ to be the public parameter used to key the ran-
domness extraction function, and chooses the other
public parameters according to the protocol. D runs
as described for Game 4, except that D uses R1 in
place of K ′′∗. When B outputs it guess of the bit b, D
outputs that R1 = Exct(X) for some X if B is correct,
and D outputs that R1 $← U1 otherwise. The proba-
bility that D is correct is 12 (Pr[σ3] + 1− Pr[σ4]). By
the security of the randomness extraction function,
we have:
 ≥ |2 Pr[D correct]− 1| (20)
= |Pr[σ3]− Pr[σ4]| (21)
τ3 = |2 Pr[σ3]− 1| (22)
≤ |2 Pr[σ3]− 2 Pr[σ4]|+ |2 Pr[σ4]− 1| (23)
≤ 2+ τ4 (24)
A.5 Analysis of Game 5
Now, we consider another adversary, D’, this time
against the randomness expansion (or pseudorandom)
function family {ExpdK(·)}K∈U1 . We define D’ to
run a copy of B, and to interact with B in such a
manner that it is the same as when B interacts with
with either Game 4 or 5. D’ receives the definition
of the function family {ExpdK(·)}K∈U1 , and an ora-
cle O(·) which is either ExpdK(·) for some value of
K unknown to D’ or a truly random function. D’
runs a copy of the protocol for B in the same way
as described for Game 4, except that whenever the
value ExpdK′′∗ (s′) for any s′ would be used in gen-
erating keys, D’ uses the value O(s′) instead. When
B outputs it guess of the bit b, D’ outputs that its
oracle is a member of the given function family if B
is correct, and D’ outputs that its oracle is a truly
random function otherwise. The probability that D’
is correct is 12 (Pr[σ4] + 1− Pr[σ5]). By the security
of the randomness expansion function we have:
Advp−randF,C (k) ≥ |2 Pr[D′ correct]− 1| (25)
= |Pr[σ4]− Pr[σ5]| (26)
τ4 = |2 Pr[σ4]− 1| (27)
≤ |2 Pr[σ4]− 2 Pr[σ5]|+ |2 Pr[σ5]− 1| (28)
≤ 2Advp−randF,C (k) + τ5 (29)
In Game 5, let us denote the key returned in the
test session query with R1⊕ExpdK′′
T∗
(s′) when b = 0,
and R2 when b = 1, where R1 and R2 are chosen
uniformly at random from U2. Now, R2 is chosen
independently of all other values in the protocol, so B
can gain no information about R2 directly; B can only
gain information about R2 by determining whether
b = 0 or b = 1. Furthermore, when b = 0, unless
B can gain some information about R1, the response
to the test session query also looks random and is
therefore indistinguishable from the case when b = 1.
To gain information about R1 from a source other
than the test session query response, B must obtain
the key of a session that has also used R1 in the gener-
ation of its key. Now, if R1 is used in the generation
of a session’s key, then that session must have had
the same session identifier, and hence exchanged the
same messages as the test session. Therefore, the ses-
sion is either owned by T ∗ with intended partner T
and received C∗ as part of its input or is owned by
T with intended partner T ∗ and had C∗ as part of
its output. However, such a session owned by T ∗ will
match the test session and so not be subject to re-
veal key queries. Hence, B can gain no information
about R1, and so B can gain no information about b
in Game 5, and therefore
τ5 = 0
Combining the results in equations (13), (19), (24)
and (29) we conclude:
τ0 ≤ n
2
orac
b
+ 2norac
(
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) + 
+Advp−randF,C (k)
) (30)
A.6 Case 2: Partner to the test session is
corrupted
Recall that we only consider partial weak forward se-
crecy for Protocol 1. Consequently we require that
1. the owner of the test session may only be par-
tially corrupted by the adversary,
2. the adversary be passive in the protocol corre-
sponding to the test session; that is there exists
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a matching session to the test session at the in-
tended partner by the time that the test session
query is issued by the adversary; and
3. the partner to the test session be fully corrupted
only after the matching session expires.
For this part of the proof we set up the following
series of 6 games with B. Game 0 and 1 are the same
as in Case 1. Game 2 and 3 are analogous to Game 2
and 3 in Case 1 except that now our target oracle is
the partner to the test session, and it is its input to
the session key that is substituted by a random value.
Game 4 and 5, which are used to prove the security of
the session key derivation mechanism via randomness
extraction and expansion also remain essentially the
same.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction
with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and
when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the
test session query, otherwise a random key from U2
is returned.
Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that if two different sessions output exactly the
same message and have the same intended partner,
the protocol halts.
Game 2. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that before the adversary begins, a random
value m $← {1, 2, . . . , norac} is chosen. We call the
mth oracle to be activated the target oracle. If the
target oracle is not the partner to the test oracle, the
protocol halts and B fails and outputs a random bit.
We denote the input message to the target oracle with
C∗, the corresponding output message with C, the
target oracle’s owner with T ∗ and the target oracle’s
intended partner with T .
Game 3. In this game, a random value K ′ $← K is
chosen. Further a bit c ∈R {0, 1} is chosen as a guess
as to whether B fully corrupts T or T ∗. Whenever C is
used as input to an oracle owned by T , the calculation
of the key is modified so that K ′ is used in place of
dec(pk , dT , C); the message output by this oracle is
calculated as usual. Similarly, K ′ is used instead of
K ′T in the calculation of the session key by T
∗.
The rest of the Game 3 is the same as Game 2. If
b = 1, a random key from U2 is returned. Otherwise,
K ′ is used in the computation of the test session as
described above.
Game 4. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that a random value K ′′ $← U1 is chosen and
the use of Exct(K ′) is replaced with K ′′.
Game 5. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that whenever the value ExpdK′′ (s′) for any
s′ would be used in generating keys, a random value
from U2 is used instead (the same random value is
used for the same value of s′; a different random value
is chosen for different s′).
In the analysis that follows, we denote with σ′i the
event that the adversary is successful in Game i and
with τ ′i the corresponding advantage.
A.7 Analysis of Games 0 to 2:
This analysis is the same as the that of Games 0 to 2
in Case 1. Thus,
τ ′0 ≤
n2orac
b
+ noracτ ′2 (31)
A.8 Analysis of Game 3:
This analysis is very similar to that of Game 3 in Case
1. We construct adversary A against the security of
the CL-KEM, using B. A is given the master public
key pk and passes this value as well as the description
of Exct(·), its key κ and {ExpdK (·)}K∈U1 to B. A
runs as described in Game 2, except that when the
target oracle is activated, A outputs eT as the identity
on which it wants to be tested. A receives a ciphertext
C for T and key K ′, which may be the decryption
of C or may be a random CL-KEM key, each with
equal probability. A then uses C as the output of the
target oracle (and hence input to the test session).
A modifies the calculation of keys so that K ′ is used
in place of dec(pk ,KeyDer(pk , α, eT ), C), and uses K ′
instead of K ′T to find the answer to the test session
query when b = 0.
All legitimate queries made by B can still be an-
swered by A using its oracles as follows.
• A corrupt query on some identity eX may be
answered with OKeyDer(eX).
• A corrupt query targeting either the certificate-
less secret value or the identity based private key
(but not both) for the owner of the test session
can also be answered with OKeyDer(T ). (Recall
that the owner of the test session T must not be
fully corrupted).
• A must maintain the session state of each oracle
so that it may be returned in answer to session
state reveal queries (session state reveal is not al-
lowed on the test session or its matching session).
• Any message CX to any party (including T )
with identity eX may be decrypted usingOdec(eX , CX) to generate keys for reveal session
key queries and the test query.
When B halts and outputs its bit b′, A halts and
outputs 1 − b′. As in Case 1, the probability that A
is correct is Pr[σ′2] when K
′ is the real key for the
CL-KEM message, and 1−Pr[σ′3] when K ′ is not the
key for the CL-KEM message. Hence,
τ ′2 ≤ 2AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) + τ ′3 (32)
A.9 Analysis of Game 4
This is the same as in Case 1. Thus,
τ ′3 ≤ 2+ τ ′4 (33)
A.10 Analysis of Game 5
This is the same as in Case 1. Thus,
τ ′4 ≤ 2Advp−randF,C (k) + τ ′5 (34)
A.11 Combining Results
Again using the same reasoning as in Case 1, we con-
clude that τ ′5 = 0, and therefore combining equations
(31), (32), (33) and (34) we have:
τ ′0 ≤
n2orac
b
+ 2norac
(
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) + 
+Advp−randF,C (k)
) (35)
This is the same advantage as in Case 1 and hence
Therorem 1 follows.
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B Proof of Theorem 2:
The security difference between Protocol 1 and 2 is
that the latter provides full WFS, i.e. in addition to
the adversarial capabilities considered in the proof of
Theorem 1, we now allow the adversary to corrupt
both parties to the test session. It is natural then
to consider the proof of Theorem 2 in two parts: the
first part where the adversary does not corrupt both
parties to the test session, and the second part where
it does. Then, the first part is essentially identical to
the proof of Theorem 1. The only difference is that
in the analysis of Game 3 (in both Case 1 and 2)
A needs to simulate the extra Diffie-Hellman values,
which A can easily do for all sessions, including the
test session. (Note that A will always choose at least
one of YA or YB , hence it can always compute K ′′AB).
We deal now with the second part of the proof,
where the adversary corrupts the two partners to the
test session. Note however that the adversary is re-
stricted to being passive during the protocol run cor-
responding to the test session – a consequence of only
being able to achieve weak forward secrecy in one
round. As we will see below this allows us to inject
a challenge Decisional Diffie-Hellman triplet into the
test session.
The second part of the proof allows any party to
be corrupted. It considers the following four games
with B.
Game 0. This game is the same as a real interaction
with the protocol. A random bit b is chosen, and
when b = 0, the real key is returned in answer to the
test session query, otherwise a random key from U2
is returned.
Game 1. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that before the adversary begins, random val-
ues j, j∗ $← {1, 2, . . . , norac} are chosen. Let T and
T ∗ be the owners of the jth and j∗th sessions respec-
tively. If the jth session at T is not the test session or
if the output of the j∗th session at T ∗ is not used as
input to the test session, then the protocol halts and
B fails and outputs a random bit. Furthermore, the
session key of the test session is calculated as usual
except that Exct(h) for h ∈R 〈f〉 replaces K ′′TT∗ . The
test session’s matching session has its key set to the
same value (i.e. a random test session key is always
returned, no matter what the value of b).
Game 2. This game is the same as the previous one
except that Exct(h) is replaced with K ′′ ∈R U1
Game 3. This game is the same as the previous one,
except that whenever the value ExpdK′′ (s′) for any
s′ would be used in generating keys, a random value
from U2 is used instead (the same random value is
used for the same value of s′; a different random value
is chosen for different s′).
B.1 Analysis Game 1
We now construct adversary A against the DDH
problem, using B. A is constructed such that pro-
vided A does not have to abort the protocol as spec-
ified in Game 1 then if A’s input is from DHF , the
view of B is the same as in Game 0, but if A’s input
is from RF , the view of B is the same as in Game 1.
Then, by Assumption 4, we can claim these games
are indistinguishable.
To begin, A generates all the protocol parameters
and passes the public parameters to B.
Let (fa, f b, h) be A’s challenge DDH inputs (with
h either f c or fab). When the jth and the j∗th sessions
are activated, A uses its inputs fa and f b instead of
the values YT and YT∗ when it generates the outputs
of these sessions. Apart from this change, all session
inputs and outputs are generated according to the
protocol specification.
When the test session query is made, A uses
Exct(h) in place of K ′′TT∗ when calculating the real
test session key.
A is able to answer all other queries correctly since
it knows all of the system parameters and all of the
session states. A outputs 1 if B is correct, 0 otherwise.
The probability that A will not have to abort the
protocol as described in Game 1 is 1n2orac . Hence, by
the game hopping technique from Dent (2006) and
using a similar logic to that shown in (26) to (29) we
have that:
τ0 ≤ 2n2oracAdvddhF,D(k) + τ1 (36)
B.2 Analysis Game 2
The analysis of Game 2 is the same as that of Game
4 of Case 1. Thus,
τ1 ≤ 2+ τ2 (37)
B.3 Analysis Game 3
The analysis of Game 3 is the same as that of Game
5 of Case 1 and 2. Thus,
τ2 ≤ 2Advp−randF,C (k) + τ3 (38)
Since the test session key is masked with a random
value, and that value is independent of all other ses-
sions, B has no advantage in Game 3 (τ3 = 0). The
value is independent because only the test session has
the test session’s session id.
B.4 Combining Results:
Let E be the event that the test session has a match-
ing session by the time B finishes, and let σ be the
event that B guesses b correctly in Protocol 2. Then
we have:
AdvskB (k) = |2 Pr[σ]− 1|
Pr[σ] = Pr[σ|E] Pr[E] + Pr[σ|¬E] Pr[¬E]
= Pr[σ|¬E] + Pr[E] (Pr[σ|E]− Pr[σ|¬E]) .
Therefore,
min (Pr[σ|¬E],Pr[σ|E]) ≤ Pr[σ]
≤ max (Pr[σ|¬E],Pr[σ|E])
and
AdvskB (k) ≤ max
(
AdvskB (k) |E, AdvskB (k) |¬E
)
and so we can combine (30), and (35)-(38) to find:
AdvskB (k) ≤
max
(
2n2oracAdv
ddh
F,D(k) + 2+ 2Adv
p−rand
F,C (k),
n2orac
b
+ 2norac
(
AdvCL-KEM-CCAE,A (k) + +
Advp−randF,C (k)
))
.
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